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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an epistemological perspective on quantum communication between parties 
that highlights the choices that must be made in order to send and obtain information. The notion 
of information obtained in such a communication is a property associated with the observers and 
while dependent on the nature of the physical system its fundamental basis is epistemic. We argue 
that the observation process is in accord with the principle of psychophysical parallelism that was 
used by Bohr, von Neumann, Schrödinger and others to establish the philosophical basis of 
complementarity but has since fallen out of fashion. This principle gave coherence to the original 
Copenhagen Interpretation without which the latter has come to have some sort of an ad hoc 
character.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A formal theory comes with its well-defined entities and rules of analysis. In addition, 
certain other entities are usually implicit in the theory but are not formally defined.  
These implicit entities and the underlying assumptions about reality, together with the 
different ways abstract entities may be mapped to intuitive notions, leads to divergent 
interpretations of the theory. Such divergences are particularly true for quantum theory 
for which the interpretations include the Copenhagen, stochastic evolution, consistent 
histories, transactional, QBism, MWI and so on (e.g. [1]-[6]). Roughly these 
interpretations fall into the epistemic and the ontic views where in the epistemic one is 
speaking of the knowledge obtained from the experiment without going into the ultimate 
nature of reality and in the ontic one is describing reality as a particular assemblage of 
objects. These views are so far from each other that their synthesis is impossible. 
 
Even though the epistemic Copenhagen Interpretation has been the dominant view 
amongst quantum theorists [6], it has been criticized for being at variance with the 
contemporary program of science of finding the ontic (ontological) basis of reality. This 
basis is sought in the structure of being (in its physical embodiment) and that of its 
becoming (e.g. [7]) as well as other algorithmic models of physics and intelligence. 
Physicists attempt to describe a physical system mathematically and logically in a manner 
that can describe its evolution and in such an ontological description there is no place for 
observers. This program has grown hand in hand with the deepening use of computers in 
society and there are models where the unfolding of the universe itself is seen in terms of 
the workings of a computer program.  
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The ontic understanding of reality becomes problematic when one brings in information 
into the mix, as has been done rather extensively in modern physics. This is because 
information implies the existence of a mind, which is outside of the realm of physics. The 
study of mind is normally done using the tools and concepts of psychology and 
neuroscience. Standard neuroscience accepts the doctrine of an identity of brain and 
mind. In this view, mind emerges from the complexity of the interconnections and its 
behavior must be completely described by the corresponding brain function leaving no 
room for agency of the individual [8]. No specific neural correlate of consciousness has 
been found [9], [10]. There are also attempts to ascribe certain counterintuitive 
characteristics of the mind to underlying quantum processing [11], [12] but as it still 
implies a machine paradigm it cannot be the complete explanation even if quantum 
mechanics is shown to play a role in brain processes.  
 
The perspective of epistemology presents a way to highlight the differences in the 
implicit assumptions. As the study of the nature of knowledge, epistemology is of 
relevance in examining interpretations of theory and the case of quantum information in a 
communications setting makes its conceptual basis most clear. We agree with the 
philosopher Fred Dretske who argued that [13] “A more precise account of information 
will yield a more creditable theory of knowledge. Maybe … communication engineers 
can help philosophers with questions raised by Descartes and Kant.” 
 
Information in a communication involves two things: first, commonalities in the 
vocabulary of communication between the two parties; and second, the capacity to make 
choices. The commonality of vocabulary requires that the underlying abstract signs used 
by the parties be shared which stresses the social aspects of communication. The capacity 
to make choice means agency that has no place in a world governed by closed laws 
unless one considers psychophysical parallelism that excludes causal interaction between 
mind and body. In the view of such parallelism, mental and physical phenomena are two 
aspects of the same reality like two sides of a coin.  
 
Note that psychophysical parallelism was a dominant philosophical view in Europe in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but now has been relegated to the margins 
[14]. According to Moritz Schlick, who was the leader of the Vienna Circle of Logical 
Positivists in the 1930s, psychophysical parallelism is the “epistemological parallelism 
between psychological conceptual system on the one hand and a physical conceptual 
system on the other. The ‘physical world’ is just the world that is designated by means of 
the system of quantitative concepts of the natural sciences.” [15] The idea is in an old one 
having been first enunciated as samavāya (inherence) in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra of Kaṇāda in 
India [16] and later in Europe by Leibnitz. 
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Now consider how choices are made and how these choices are intelligible. With 
Heidegger, one may speak of the difference between the ontical and the ontological 
where the first is concerned with facts about objects and the second is concerned with the 
meaning of Being, with how objects are intelligible as entities. According to Heidegger 
[17], “Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of 
categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it 
has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as 
its fundamental task.”  
 
There are usually several unstated assumptions regarding the process of obtaining 
information from an experimental situation that involve the nature of the observer. 
Specifically, we endow the observer with the capacity to make intelligent classifications 
and choices, either directly or through the agency of instruments and computing devices, 
which are not a part of the formal framework that describes the physical processes being 
investigated. It is interesting that some interpretations strive to take out the observer from 
the framework, without explaining how the central role of the selectivity in the 
observation process is to be explained. 
 
In this paper we first review the problem of observation in epistemic and ontic 
interpretations of quantum theory presenting the key points of Bohr, von Neumann, and 
Schrödinger that views the epistemic understanding emerging from the principle of 
psychophysical parallelism. Next we examine the question of information in classical and 
quantum settings highlighting how its definition in the framework of ensembles requires 
an epistemic basis. We argue that the Copenhagen Interpretation provides the best 
resolution to the problems associated with information. 
 
2. THE OBSERVATION PROCESS AND COMPLEMENTARITY 
We first consider the epistemic Copenhagen Interpretation in which the physical universe 
is separated into two parts, the first part is the system being observed, and the second part 
is the human observing agent, together with the instruments. The agent is therefore an 
extended entity that described in mental terms and it includes not only his apparatus but 
also instructions to colleagues on how to set up the instruments and report on their 
observations. The Heisenberg cut (also called the von Neumann cut) is the hypothetical 
interface between quantum events and the observer's information, knowledge, or 
awareness. Below the cut everything is governed by the wave function, whereas above 
the cut one must use classical description.  
 
Although the arbitrariness of the cut has come in for criticism and spurred the 
development of other interpretations, it is a device for aggregating the effects of the mind 
or minds associated with the observational regime and it is a reasonable way to separate 
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the inanimate from the animate especially since the brain itself may be viewed as a 
machine. Bohr stressed the elusive separation between subject and object [18]: 
 
The epistemological problem under discussion may be characterized briefly as follows: 
For describing our mental activity, we require, on one hand, an objectively given content 
to be placed in opposition to a perceiving subject, while, on the other hand, as is already 
implied in such an assertion, no sharp separation between object and subject can be 
maintained, since the perceiving subject also belongs to our mental content. 
 
 
Von Neumann describes the principle thus [6]: “[I]t must be possible so to describe the 
extra-physical process of the subjective perception as if it were in reality in the physical 
world -- i.e., to assign to its parts equivalent physical processes in the objective 
environment, in ordinary space.” He adds further: 
 
The boundary between the two is arbitrary to a very large extent. In particular we saw in 
the four different possibilities in the example above, that the observer in this sense needs 
not to become identified with the body of the actual observer: In one instance in the 
above example, we included even the thermometer in it, while in another instance, even 
the eyes and optic nerve tract were not included. That this boundary can be pushed 
arbitrarily deeply into the interior of the body of the actual observer is the content of the 
principle of the psycho-physical parallelism -- but this does not change the fact that in 
each method of description the boundary must be put somewhere, if the method is not to 
proceed vacuously, i.e., if a comparison with experiment is to be possible. Indeed 
experience only makes statements of this type: an observer has made a certain 
(subjective) observation; and never any like this: a physical quantity has a certain value. 
 
Now quantum mechanics describes the events which occur in the observed portions of 
the world, so long as they do not interact with the observing portion, with the aid of the 
process 2, but as soon as such an interaction occurs, i.e., a measurement, it requires the 
application of process 1. The dual form is therefore justified. However, the danger lies in 
the fact that the principle of the psycho-physical parallelism is violated, so long as it is 
not shown that the boundary between the observed system and the observer can be 
displaced arbitrarily in the sense given above. 
 
The above quotes make it clear that psychophysical parallelism is not equivalent to brain-
mind identity of neuroscience in which the mind is an emergent property with neural 
structures as ground thus admitting a causal link going from biology to the mind.  
 
The question of interaction between mental states and the wave function was addressed in 
the Copenhagen Interpretation (CI) [2] in which the wave function is properly understood 
epistemologically, that is, it represents the experimenter’s knowledge of the system, and 
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upon observation there is a change in this knowledge. Operationally, it is a dualist 
position, where there is a fundamental split between observers and objects. The 
placement of the cut between the subject and the object is arbitrary to the extent it 
depends on the nature of the interaction between the two.  
 
In the ontic view of the wave function as in the Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI), there 
is no collapse of the wave function and the interaction is seen through the lens of 
decoherence, which occurs when states interact with the environment producing 
entanglement [19]. By the process of decoherence the system makes transition from a 
pure state to a mixture of states that observers end up measuring. The problem of collapse 
of the wave function is sidestepped by speaking of interaction between different 
subsystems. But since the entire universe is also a quantum system, the question of how 
this whole system splits into independent subsystems arises. It would seem that the 
splitting into subsystems is itself an observational choice, rather than fundamental. This 
splitting serves about the same function as the Heisenberg cut of CI. Furthermore, such 
an ontic view has no place for minds, which can at best be taken as traces of 
mathematical operations thus ruling out agency. 
 
Finally, the principle of psychophysical parallelism is consistent with complementarity 
and indeed the inspiration for it [20]. Bohr argued that the consideration of the biological 
counterpart to the observation of the relation between mind and body does not become 
part of an infinite regress. He argued that [21] “We have no possibility through physical 
observation of finding out what in brain processes corresponds to conscious experience. 
An analogy to this is the information we can obtain concerning the structure of cells and 
the effects this structure has on the way organic life displays itself.… What is 
complementary is not the idea of a mind and a body but that part of the contents of the 
mind which deals with the ideas of physics and the organisms and that situation where 
we bring in the thought about the observing subject.” 
 
Schrödinger implicitly invoked the principle in describing the state function of a quantum 
state (psi) as representing our knowledge about the system.  He said [22]:  
 
Reality resists imitation through a model… We have nothing but our reckoning scheme, i.e., 
what is a best possible knowledge of the object. The psi-function … is now the means for 
predicting probability of measurement results. In it is embodied the momentarily-attained 
sum of theoretically based future expectation, somewhat as laid down in a catalog… [This] 
the catalog of expectations is initially compiled. From then on it changes with time, just as 
the state of the model of classical theory, in constrained and unique fashion… For each 
measurement one is required to ascribe to the psi-function (= the prediction-catalog) a 
characteristic, quite sudden change, which depends on the measurement result obtained, and 
so cannot be foreseen; from which alone it is already quite clear that this second kind of 
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change of the psi-function has nothing whatever in common with its orderly development 
between two measurements… And indeed because one might never dare impute abrupt 
unforeseen changes to a physical thing or to a model, but because in the realism point of view 
observation is a natural process like any other and cannot per se bring about an interruption 
of the orderly flow of natural events. 
 
It is clear that Schrödinger is stressing the epistemic nature of the state function. 
Elsewhere, he presents the psychophysical parallel basis of this claim in a clearer form: 
“Consciousness cannot be accounted for in physical terms. For consciousness is 
absolutely fundamental. It cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else.” [23] 
 
The complementarity of aspects, such as wave and particle, is a consequence of the kind 
of measurement that is made which emanates from the choice made by the observer and 
it is not the description of an ontologically defined entity in two equivalent forms as in 
the representation of a number directly or in terms of its inverse sequence [24]. The 
experimenter is not describing reality ontologically; rather, he is obtaining knowledge 
about it that is related to the nature of his interaction with the system. The particle view is 
the one imposed on reality by the mind governed by a classical mode [25]. Nonlocality is 
an issue only if one takes the particle picture, together with local interaction, to be 
underlying reality and, therefore, the violation of Bell’s theorem by experiments does not 
imply a fundamental difficulty [26].  
 
 
3. THE COMMUNICATIONS SETTING 
We consider the problem of exchange of information between two parties. Figure 1 
describes the communications context for the consideration of information [27]. It 
consists of a sender and a receiver together with an ensemble of signals (which could be 
letters). The statistical characteristics of the signals are known both to the sender and the 
receiver. There could be further relationship between the symbols and physical or 
abstract objects in which case one can also speak of a semantic content communicated 
through the transmissions. 
                 
  Figure 1. Exchange of information 
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Let the probabilities of the signals that are transmitted and then received by the sender, S, 
and the receiver, R, be ),( and )( ji ypxp  respectively (the discrete index refers to the 
specific signal being considered out of a list that ranges from 1 onwards). 
 
These are the a priori probabilities associated with the sender, the receiver, and their 
world. The sender now chooses a specific one out of the ensemble and sends it to the 
receiver and repeats this process. The information exchanged between S and R is: 
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and this information is always positive, if not zero. The informational entropy is, 
therefore: 
 
∑=
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Also,  
 )|()();( YXHXHYXI −=       (3) 
 
We ask: what is the connection between probabilistic information provided by the 
entropy expressions above and the knowledge obtained by the receiving party? At the  
most basic level, the following claims may be made regarding the communication 
process: 
 
1. There exist associations of data, which requires separating it from other data, and 
abstractions (input X and output Y) which are assumed without explaining how 
this is achieved. 
2. Training set with correct classifications (or data typical of the ensemble) that 
involves different modes of behavior. 
3. Classification task (as in AI and neural networks) with hierarchical levels of 
understanding. 
4. Duality between the process of the identification of the ensemble (learning) and 
that of subsequent measurements. 
 
Implicit in the identification of the ensemble is the mind and it is also implicitly 
acknowledged in the problem of classical information. The sharing of the ensemble must 
be part of a social process.  
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Now consider the communications context for the quantum case. Assume the sender and 
the receiver both are informed of the ensemble of states {ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρn} with probability 
{p1, p2, ..., pn}. Every density operator may be viewed as a mixture of pure states 
 
ii
i
i ϕϕλρ ∑=         (4) 
where iλ are the eigenvalues and iϕ are the eigenvectors of ρ. The entropy may be 
written as [12]: 
 
i
i
inS λλρ log)( ∑−=         (5) 
where iλ are the eigenvalues of ρ. Thus the measurements along the reference bases may 
be associated with probability values iλ in analogy with the classical entropy expression 
of  i
i
i pp log∑− , where the ith outcome, out of a given set, has probability pi.  
Operationally, classical and quantum information work differently. Given an unknown 
state distributed over two systems, consider how much information needs to be sent to 
transfer the full state to a system. In the classical case, partial information must always be 
positive, but in the quantum case it can be negative. If the partial information is positive, 
its sender needs to communicate this number of quantum bits to the receiver; if it is 
negative, then sender and receiver instead gain the corresponding potential for future 
quantum communication [28]. The idea of negative partial information makes sense only 
in the context of observers that are epistemologically connected. 
 
Now consider the case of Figure 2 in which the sender has access to states in an ensemble 
and he is sending these to the receiver. We are interested in considering the entropy of 
this situation. If the sender is Nature, the receiver is the experimenter who is determining 
both the ensemble as well as the information that is associated with it. 
 
 
  Figure 2. Directed information transfer 
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If the ensemble consists of a single unknown letter, the Shannon entropy associated with 
the ensemble is zero. The information in any single communication is also zero. Starting 
with the hypothesis that there are two potential states, the receiver will find in the nth test 
that the probability that it is a single letter is 1-2-n. 
 
In contrast, in the quantum case, let the ensemble consist of a single pure state. We 
assume that the reference bases of the sending and the receiving parties are aligned 
without going into the question of the cost associated with that process. The von 
Neumann entropy associated with this case is zero. Nevertheless, the amount of 
information that the receiver can obtain is infinite [12]. This infinite information will be 
in terms of the specific phase information associated with the state which, theroretically, 
has infinite precision. 
 
Parenthetically, an application of this is when two parties wish to share a random number. 
The sender codes the random number into the polarization angle of the many copies of 
the photons.  The determination of the angle by the receiver will eventually transfer the 
random sequence to the receiver [12],[29]. 
 
The ability to obtain information from the unknown state implies a corresponding 
potential energy. The equivalence between energy and information is given by kTln2 (or 
about 0.69 kT) which is both the minimum amount of work needed to store one bit of 
binary information and the maximum that is liberated when this bit is erased, where k is 
Boltzmann's constant and T is the temperature of the storage medium in degrees Kelvin 
[30].  
 
Since the unknown state may be assumed to be localized at a physical point, one can 
thereby conclude that energy is associated with space. This is restating the concept of 
zero-point energy that is normally derived using Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. The 
ability of obtain information from space would depend on how the experimenter interacts 
with it.  
 
The consideration of information also requires choices that go into the formation of the 
ensemble that is used by the communicating parties. This is only possible by the observer 
making choices. The manner in which these choices are made will change the value of 
the entropy associated with the process of information exchange [12]. The choices 
establish that the information is epistemic. Without consideration of this aspect of 
information basis, we are confronted by difficulties such as the information paradox of 
cosmology [31].  
 
 
10 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
The notion of psychophysical parallelism rules out the need of hidden-variable theories. 
According to it, quantum mechanics is an epistemic theory in which there is no need to 
introduce additional variables that will convert it into an ontic theory. The lack of 
experimental support for hidden-variable theories is to be expected within the framework 
of this parallelism. It is also not surprising that extensions to quantum theory cannot give 
more information about the outcomes of future measurements than quantum theory itself 
[32]. 
 
One must also assume that the psychological part of the psychophysical parallelism 
notion implies that there exists no specific correlate of consciousness in the brain (as it 
cannot have a physical basis). The quantum Zeno effect [33] does provide a mechanism 
on how observation can influence dynamics but it does not explain the ontological 
position of the observer.  
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